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Abstract
Background and objectives
Latin American (LA) countries have begun to adopt a variety of regulations targeting sugar-
sweetened beverages (SSBs) for public health reasons. Our objective was to characterize
the regulatory strategies designed to reduce SSB consumption over the last decade, and
assess the available evidence on their enforcement and impact.
Methods
We searched legal and public health databases for public and private SSBs regulations in
14 LA countries and then conducted a systematic review of the available literature. We
tracked comparative variations in the type of body issuing the regulations, their scope, and
binding status. We present data following a 5-category framework we named NUTRE that
classifies SSBs regulations as: (1) restrictions to SSB availability in schools (N), (2) taxes
and other economic incentives to discourage consumption (U), (3) restrictions on advertis-
ing and marketing (T), (4) regulations on government procurement and subsidies (R), and
(5) product labeling rules (E).
Results
Since 2006, 14 LA countries have adopted at least 39 public and private SSB regulatory ini-
tiatives across the NUTRE framework. Comprehensive efforts have only been approved by
Chile, Me´xico and Ecuador, while the rest have comparatively few initiatives. 28 out of the
39 regulatory initiatives were passed by legislative and executive bodies; 11 initiatives repre-
sent self-regulatory undertakings by the beverage industries. An 86% (24/28) of public sec-
tor regulations are binding; 56% (22/39) contain explicit monitoring or evaluation methods;
and 62% (24/39) provide for sanctions. Moreover, 23 regulations specify the body in charge
of monitoring the new rules and standards.
Conclusions
LA countries are targeting SSB consumption through a variety of mechanisms, particularly
via restrictions to availability in schools and through taxes. Interdisciplinary evidence
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0205694 October 19, 2018 1 / 17
a1111111111
a1111111111
a1111111111
a1111111111
a1111111111
OPEN ACCESS
Citation: Bergallo P, Castagnari V, Ferna´ndez A,
Mejı´a R (2018) Regulatory initiatives to reduce
sugar-sweetened beverages (SSBs) in Latin
America. PLoS ONE 13(10): e0205694. https://doi.
org/10.1371/journal.pone.0205694
Editor: Daniel Romer, University of Pennsylvania,
UNITED STATES
Received: April 30, 2018
Accepted: September 28, 2018
Published: October 19, 2018
Copyright: © 2018 Bergallo et al. This is an open
access article distributed under the terms of the
Creative Commons Attribution License, which
permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
reproduction in any medium, provided the original
author and source are credited.
Data Availability Statement: All data are contained
within the paper and and we will additionally upload
a list of national regulations and the websites
where they can be found to further aid future
researchers in the following website http://
proyectobasta.esy.es.
Funding: This paper is part of a research on sugar
sweetened beverages consumption in Argentina
financed by the International Development
Research Centre (https://www.idrc.ca) Grant N885.
The funders had no role in study design data
comparing alternative regulatory strategies is scarce, and few studies offer data on impact
and implementation challenges. More evidence and further comparative assessments are
needed to support future decision-making.
Introduction
In the past two decades, non-communicable diseases (NCDs) levels have soared across Latin
America (LA), in part due to the fastest growing obesity rates in the world [1]. Sugar sweetened
beverages (SSBs), which combine high caloric content and minimal nutritional value, are argu-
ably one of the most important drivers of the obesity epidemic [2, 3]. With consumption levels
rocketing [2], SSBs account for an important portion of the daily caloric intake of poor com-
munities, with numbers ranging from 10% [2] to as much as 23% [4] of total calorie consump-
tion. Moreover, though SSBs sales are decreasing in some regions of the developed world, they
are on the rise in LA and other developing areas [5, 6]. Joining a global trend toward reducing
consumption on public health grounds [7, 8, 9], SSBs have become increasingly appealing tar-
gets of regulation throughout Latin America. Little is known, however, regarding the recent
Latin American wave of regulatory initiatives focused on restricting the affordability, availabil-
ity and acceptability of SSBs. Our research had two specific goals. First, to describe the regula-
tory strategies that LA countries have adopted to reduce SSB consumption. Second, to assess
the available evidence on these new regulatory strategies, their enforcement challenges, and
their impacts.
Materials and methods
To achieve these aims, we conducted two types of literature searches. For both searches, we
focused on governmental and industry initiatives concerning SSBs approved from 2008 to
2016. “Regulatory initiatives” here refer to public policies that limit the affordability, availabil-
ity and/or acceptability of SSBs. Multiple initiatives may be associated with a single regulatory
source, as a single piece of legislation may create several initiatives. Initiatives were included
provided they had been formally adopted, irrespective of their implementation stage. The first
search was focused on regulatory and legal materials and consisted of an exploratory search in
Google Scholar, Hein Online, Wiley Online Library, JStor and Project Muse. This search was
conducted in English and Spanish using the following keywords: soda OR soft drinks OR SSB
AND regulation OR initiative OR law. Secondary sources retrieved were assessed to track rele-
vant information to access primary source regulations (laws, resolutions, decrees, guidelines or
self-regulatory initiatives).
We excluded government policy initiatives that were too vague or too general to affect the
availability of SSBs, such as (a) broad food guidelines aimed at the general public (present in
most countries), (b) broad nutrition education initiatives and (c) other unspecific initiatives
that favor healthy eating or physical activity habits but make no explicit reference to SSBs.
The second search consisted of a systematic literature review of the research describing or
assessing the operation of new SSB regulations and policy initiatives conducted in SciElo,
Redalyc, JSTOR, Medline, BVS and LILACS for the period ranging from January 2007 to April
2017. The following key words were surveyed (both in English and in Spanish): soda OR sugar
sweetened beverages OR SSB OR sugary drinks OR nutrition OR food AND obesity AND
Latin America OR Argentina OR Barbados OR Brazil OR Chile OR Colombia OR Costa Rica
OR Dominica OR Ecuador OR Salvador OR Mexico OR Peru OR Uruguay OR Venezuela
SSB regulations in Latin America
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AND regulation OR public policy OR self-regulation OR law OR tax OR incentive OR label�
OR school OR subsidy OR advertising OR publicity OR commercialization OR public con-
tract. Key words were considered when appearing in “full text” but country names were
selected only when they appeared in the title. This distinction was made to filter irrelevant
results, using only countries where our initial research had shown relevant results. Our review
was limited to academic articles published in peer-reviewed journals. We did not indepen-
dently evaluate the quality of the studies. Because this search aimed at assessing the content
and application of the new policy initiatives, experimental or modelling studies were inten-
tionally excluded. Two trained reviewers (VC and PB) read the titles of all the citations
retrieved from the electronic database searches and removed those clearly unrelated to regula-
tions., Abstracts were then reviewed to further exclude studies that did not meet inclusion cri-
teria. At the third stage, the full articles were checked for eligibility with cross-checking by
senior investigators. Reasons for exclusion were documented at each stage.
Data from the searches was extracted and categorized according to a 5-category framework
we developed called NUTRE (Table 1), an acronym corresponding to Spanish words and
inspired by the NOURISHING project of the World Cancer Research Fund [10]. The five cate-
gories are:
N: (Niños y alimentación escolar) Restrictions on the availability of SSBs in schools, where only
restrictions directly referring to SSBs are considered.
U: (Impuestos y subsidios) Economic incentives affecting the affordability of SSBs, i.e. taxes or
incentives with explicit public health objectives.
T: (Trabas a publicidad dirigida a niños) Regulations of advertising or other promotion activi-
ties regarding unhealthy food or drinks. These refer to restrictions directly dealing with
food and/or drinks, excluding restrictions aiming to protect children in general.
R: (Regulación de contratación pública) Government procurement and/or public contracting
restrictions.
E: (Etiquetado frontal) Front-of package (FOP) labelling strategies.
Results
SSBs regulatory initiatives
We found 36 legislative or executive national regulations and 11 industry guidelines from 14
LA countries that set out 39 SSB initiatives spanned across the NUTRE framework (Table 2).
These 39 comprehensive efforts were mostly concentrated in a few nations, notably Chile,
Mexico and Ecuador, while the rest had less comprehensive initiatives. Brazil’s regulations were
mostly concentrated in advertising restrictions (T), schools (N), and public procurement initia-
tives (R). Ecuador is the only country that has enacted government regulations across all the
NUTRE categories; industry has not adopted any private-initiative regulations in that country.
Twenty-eight of those initiatives were passed by legislative and executive bodies, while 11
others were self-regulatory undertakings from beverage industries. Among the total regulatory
initiatives sanctioned by governmental institutions, 24 imposed mandatory requirements, one
contained non-mandatory guiding principles and 3 include mixed regulations where compli-
ance is mandatory or not depending on the subject upon whom duties are applied. Roughly
half the initiatives contain explicit monitoring or evaluation methods and a similar proportion
provides for some form of sanction in case of lack of compliance. Moreover, 20 initiatives spec-
ify the body in charge of monitoring the new food and drink rules and standards.
SSB regulations in Latin America
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Evidence on implementation
In our second search, focused on implementation, we 1601 articles were initially identified and
titles and abstracts were screened, 55 articles were assessed in full-text (Fig 1). After discarding
ineligible articles, the remaining 26 were classified based on whether they focused on describ-
ing regulatory initiatives (14), analyzing implementation of those initiatives (4) or appraising
their impact (5). 3 articles focused both on describing policies and analyzing their implementa-
tion. The information retrieved from the literature review was used to (a) cross-check the
regulatory sources collected as part of the first search and primarily used for the NUTRE
Table 1. NUTRE framework.
Category description Number of countries with public
regulations
Number of countries with private-initiative
regulations
Countries Year of policy
sanction
N Restrictions on the sale of SSBs in
schools.
7 2 Brazil 2006, 2009, 2014, 2016
(V)
Chile 2012, 2015
Colombia 2016 (V)
Costa Rica 2013
Ecuador 2009, 2010, 2014
Mexico 2010
Peru 2013, 2015
Uruguay 2013
U SSB taxes with public health
objectives
5 N/A Barbados 2015
Chile 2014
Dominica 2015
Ecuador 2016
Mexico 2013
T Advertising/ promotion
restrictions
9 8 Argentina 2008 (V)
Bolivia 2016
Brazil 2006, 2013 (V), 2014
Chile 2012, 2013 (V), 2015
Colombia 2013 (V)
Costa Rica 2013
Ecuador 2014
El
Salvador
2015 (V)
Mexico 2009 (V), 2013
Peru 2013
Uruguay 2013, 2013 (V)
Venezuela 2008 (V)
R Government procurement
restrictions
2 N/A Brazil 2009
Ecuador 2009
E FOP labelling strategies 5 1 Bolivia 2016
Chile 2012, 2015
Colombia 2016 (V)
Ecuador 2013
Mexico 2013, 2015
Venezuela 2015
“Years” refers to years where official norms were approved.
(V) indicates private-initiative regulations.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0205694.t001
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framework, and (b) appraise the implementation of the initiatives. This data is analyzed in the
next section.
Findings in each NUTRE category
Using data on the regulatory initiatives classified in the NUTRE framework and the informa-
tion retrieved from the literature review, we describe and critically assess the regulatory epi-
sodes corresponding to each category in the NUTRE framework as follows.
Restrictions on the availability of SSBs in schools (N)
SSB consumption in schools is critical not only for the direct effect on children’s health, but
also because schools have traditionally been crucial for companies to create brand awareness
and build social norms [5, 11]. LA countries have become increasingly aware of the impor-
tance of the issue and SSB regulation efforts have intensified in the past few years (only Brazil
and Ecuador regulated SSB availability before 2010 and five other countries have done so
since).
However, public policies differ greatly in their origin and their content (Table 3). Brazil,
Ecuador, Chile, Peru, and Uruguay have enacted national statutes via their legislative branches
as well as executive-level decrees to regulate SSB availability in schools, whereas in Costa Rica
and Mexico, restrictions have come from executive-level decrees only, suggesting less broad
social consensus. All these regulations are mandatory. However, most of them (especially
administrative regulations that are enacted by the executive branch via decrees or resolutions)
do not provide for specific sanctions in case of non-compliance. This is the case, for instance,
of the regulations approved in Ecuador. Mexico is the exemption, as its decree to ban drinks
Table 2. Regulatory content of initiatives per category of the NUTRE framework (numbers refer to countries).
N U T R E Total
Children Taxes Marketing Government Procurement Labelling
Type of regulation
Public 7 5 9 2 5 28
Private 2 0 8 0 1 11
Binding status (for public regulations only n = 28)
Mandatory compliance 4 5 8 2 5 24
Voluntary compliance 1 0 0 0 0 1
Mixed 2 0 1 0 0 3
Monitoring and evaluation methods
Yes 5 5 5 1 2 18
No 3 0 9 1 4 17
Mixed 1 0 3 0 0 4
Sanctions
Yes 3 5 6 1 4 19
No 5 7 1 2 15
Mixed 1 4 5
Monitoring body
Yes 5 5 7 1 2 20
No 3 8 1 4 16
Mixed 1 2 3
“Mixed” refers to regulations where application varies depending on the subject upon whom duties are applied.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0205694.t002
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with over 10cal/250ml from schools (except on Fridays in secondary schools) imposes clear-
cut sanctions for infringement.
Regulatory norms also vary in their scope and content, ranging from complete SSB bans to
softer recommendations to avoid their sale. Prohibitions are usually based on a maximum con-
tent of added sugar; this varies by amount. The most stringent benchmark, in Peru, bans all
drinks with over 2.5g sugar/100ml and the most permissive, in Ecuador and Uruguay bans
drinks with over 7.5g/100ml, but parameters generally disallow full-calorie SSBs. Added sugar
rules leave untargeted drinks such as 100% fruit juices that, although high in calories and a
potential obesity prevention target, do not contain artificially added sugar. Only Mexico has
established a strict maximum calorie content for drinks, virtually banning the sale of all drinks
but water in secondary schools (while primary schools have an explicit water-only policy).
In 2016, beverage companies responded to the regulatory trend, adopting self-imposed
commitments pledging to sell only water, drinks with over 12% fruit juice and cereal-based
drinks in primary schools in Colombia [12] and only water, fruit juice, coconut water and
dairy products in schools for children under 12 years (or mostly under 12) in Brazil [13].
Fig 1. Prisma flowchart.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0205694.g001
SSB regulations in Latin America
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These private-initiative pledges are actually more stringent in their content than official regula-
tions. However, self-regulatory commitments have other limitations -especially as far as imple-
mentation is concerned—since there is no control over their enforcement and thus, they are
often ignored [14].
Most SSB bans cover both public and private schools. Only Costa Rica makes a distinction,
with a mandatory ban in public schools and softer recommendations for private schools [15].
The overall regional pattern differs from the trend in other parts of the world, where distinc-
tions between public and private schools are more common [5]. Moreover, not all of the Latin
American restrictions apply to secondary schools, where adolescents are sometimes consid-
ered mature enough to make their own choices and none applies explicitly to universities.
Ecuadorean law applies to “educational establishments at all levels” [16], but it is unclear
whether universities are included in this category. Inclusion of universities was an issue of
much debate in both Chile (at congressional discussions) [17] and in Mexico (at the Supreme
Court level) [18]. In both cases universities were ultimately considered not included within the
regulations. Softer regulations were issued in Uruguay and Brazil, where guidelines contain
specific recommendations not to offer SSBs at schools, but schools are not legally bound to
comply.
There is a noteworthy lack of regulation of beverages containing artificial sweeteners in
schools in the region. Only Mexico has set limits to the amount of artificial sweetener accept-
able for drinks to be sold in schools and Costa Rica indirectly limits the availability of low calo-
rie soft drinks by prohibiting all carbonated drinks. This is similar to the experiences from
around the globe, where regulations consistently ban full-calorie beverages but have heteroge-
neous approaches regarding the limitation of low calorie sweeteners [5]. As the evidence on
the long-term health effects of artificial sweeteners and their role in preventing weight gain
continues to evolve [19], regulations may need to do so as well.
LA regulations also fail to encompass SSB sale in areas around schools, which might limit
the efficiency of the proposed policies, since studies have described the associations between
the number of food vendors around a school, the availability of processed and unhealthy food
in the area, and children’s BMI [20, 21]. Despite their potential, restrictions to the sale of
unhealthy foods in the vicinity of schools are relatively scarce not only in the region, but also
Table 3. Restrictions on the sale of SSBs in schools. (V) refers to private-initiative regulations.
Country Mandatory
compliance
Restricted drinks [Categories adapted from [5]} Coverage
Type Max sugar content
permitted /100ml
Restricts artificially
sweetened beverages
Includes private
schools
Includes high
school
Brazil No All SSBs that exceed certain sugar content "High in" sugar No Yes No
Brazil (V) Yes All drinks except water, milk, 100% fruit juice N/A Yes Yes No
Chile Yes All SSBs that exceed certain sugar content 5g No Yes No
Colombia
(V)
Yes All drinks except water, milk, 100% fruit juice,
drinks with over 12% fruit and cereal-based
drinks
N/A Yes Yes No
Costa Rica Mixed All carbonated drinks and SSBs that exceed
certain sugar content
6g Yes Yes (non-
mandatory)
Yes
Ecuador Yes All SSBs that exceed certain sugar content 7.5g No Yes Yes
Mexico Yes All drinks except water (primary school) // All
drinks that exceed caloric content (10 cal/
250ml)
N/A Yes (primary school) //
No (secondary school)
Yes Yes
Peru Yes All SSBs that exceed certain sugar content 2.5g No Yes Yes
Uruguay No All drinks except water, milk, 100% fruit juice 7.5g Yes Yes Yes
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0205694.t003
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around the globe. South Korea is a noteworthy exception, since it has established “Green Food
Zones” 200 meters around schools, where the sale of junk foods and beverages is restricted
[22]. Although it is too soon to measure the impact of that experience on health, some indica-
tors seem promising [23]. In the United States, some cities have established restrictions to the
establishment of fast-food restaurants in the proximity of schools [24], but these efforts are few
somewhat scattered.
There is little research evidence on the challenges faced in the implementation of school
SSB regulations. Roughly, half of the analyzed regulations refer to monitoring and/or evalua-
tion schemes in the books, but provide little information on their application in practice.
Available studies focus mainly on Mexico, where the National Agreement for Healthy
Nutrition (ANSA, for its Spanish acronym) and its subsequent “General Guidelines to regulate
the distribution of food and drinks at schools” [25] have reportedly encountered strong imple-
mentation barriers [4, 26, 27, 28]. These limitations are mainly related to structural weaknesses
[28, 29], especially the lack of a strong official implementation strategy, that takes into account
education regarding the policies, operational training, cultural barriers; and strategies to over-
come the economic pressures of school beverage vendors [29]. The two studies assessing this
issue in Mexico at the local level concluded that guidelines are generally not followed [29, 30].
Strong industry opposition [30] was noted as a crucial obstacle to the implementation of these
regulations [4] and proved especially strong in the process of enacting Mexico’s General
Guidelines on the distribution of food and drinks at schools [11]; which were weakened due to
industry pressure [4, 11].
None of the studies captured in the literature review reports on an evaluation of the impact
of national school-based initiatives carried out in Latin America. However, at least one study
has reviewed evaluations of other school-based initiatives carried out at the local level and con-
cluded that local level initiatives can have a positive impact on weight gain and should thus be
recommended [31]).
Use of economic incentives that affect the affordability of SSBs (U)
Taxes on unhealthy food or drink have been promoted by the World Health Organization as
potentially effective measures to reduce consumption [32]. Taxes can be levied in the forms
of excise, sales or value-added (VAT) taxes [33], although experts usually advocate for excise
taxes [3], as they increase shelf price and are easier to collect (reducing transaction costs and
the likelihood of tax evasion) [29]. Tax regulations also vary in terms of the kind of product
taxed and the applicable rate (Table 4). Fixed tax rates should foresee the possible impact of
inflation, which could dilute the effect of the tax. This is an important issue in the acute infla-
tionary context of the region, and both countries which use this type of rate (Ecuador (for
SSBs with over 25g sugar per liter) and Mexico) have anticipated it. While in Ecuador the tax
is updated annually according to the variation of the Consumer Price Index [34], in Mexico
it is updated only when the accumulated increase in the Consumer Price Index exceeds 10%
[35]. Only taxes which explicitly refer to health purposes were included in the NUTRE
framework.
Tax efforts usually require legislative change and thus demand levels of social agreement
that are not easy to achieve. Moreover, health-related taxes have been vigorously opposed by
the SSB industry using a wide array of arguments, including, among others, the potential for
job and other economic losses, disproportional impact on the poorest populations, and illegiti-
macy of government market intervention. The industry’s strong lobbying practices have
proven successful in Colombia [36] and in Argentina, where proposals for a tax on SSBs were
defeated in Congress in 2016 and 2017 respectively [37].
SSB regulations in Latin America
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Four countries in the region have implemented excise taxes on SSBs and Chile raised its
VAT 5% for SSBs with more than 15g sugar/240ml (while decreasing the VAT for drinks with-
out sugar). Mexico is the most salient case, not only because it was the first country to imple-
ment such a tax in 2013, but also because the process to pass the 1 peso/liter tax to all SSBs was
fierce on both sides of the struggle and gained massive global media attention. Mexico’s experi-
ence could therefore prove to be a key case-study to determine the impact of the tax on SSB
consumption, thus possibly encouraging other countries to use fiscal policies to reduce SSB
and junk food consumption [48]. Four out of six of the studies we retrieved as part of our liter-
ature review refer specifically to Mexico’s SSB and junk food tax. One of these studies [38] ana-
lyzed the tax pass-through rate (i.e. whether the tax is passed on to consumers via prices) in
rural areas and concluded that the tax had not been fully transferred to prices (at least through
December 2014). The other three papers dealing with Mexico’s tax policies [39, 40, 41] evaluate
the effects of the tax on consumption of SSBs or junk food. As far as SSB consumption goes,
both studies [40, 41] (by the same lead author) concluded that consumption decreased in the
first and second year after the implementation of the tax and that the drop in consumption
appears to be increasing. These findings are consistent with the research in other parts of the
world [42, 43]. All these studies, however, have certain important limitations, most notably the
impossibility of determining whether consumption has declined solely on account of the tax
implementation or has been affected by other factors (e.g. increased public health education,
campaigns, etc.). There are as yet no studies assessing the impacts of the recent taxes on health.
It should be noted that another study was published after our review ended, examining the
trends in beverage prices in Barbados after the introduction of the tax on SSBs [44]. Although
preliminary, this study shows that, following the implementation of the tax, the prices of SSBs
increased 5.9% in average, whereas prices for non-SSBs remained mostly flat. This evidence
shows that the tax is being passed onto prices, although not fully. This is consistent with the
Mexican experience (although the Mexican case is even more promising, since the tax was
fully passed onto prices in urban areas), and points to the fact that in both cases the tax is
indeed being passed onto prices, the first step for it to have the desired effect on consumers. It
should be noted that, because this is a subject under constant review, it is likely that other arti-
cles will appear before publication.
The studies also reveal other limitations in LA tax reforms. None of the region’s taxes reach
the 20% price increase recommended by experts for consistent impact on consumption and
Table 4. SSB taxes in Latin American countries.
Country Tax Beverages taxed
Type of
tax
Type of
rate
Rate Adjusts to
inflation
Type of beverage Includes artificially
sweetened drinks
Includes energy
drinks
Mexico Excise Fixed $1/liter Yes All SSBs No Yes
Barbados Excise % of
price
10% N/A All SSBs No Yes
Dominica Excise % of
price
10% N/A All SSBs No Yes
Ecuador Excise % of
price
N/A Carbonated beverages with�25g sugar/liter Yes Yes
Excise Fixed us$0,18 /100g
sugar
Yes SSBs with�25g sugar/liter No No
Chile VAT % of
price
10% N/A Non- alcoholic drinks with added coloring,
flavoring or sweeteners
Yes Yes
VAT % of
price
18% N/A SSBs�15g sugar/240ml No Yes
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0205694.t004
SSB regulations in Latin America
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hence on health [32, 33]. It should also be noted that earmarking tax revenue to specific
health-related objectives (public awareness campaigns, prevention programs, obesity treat-
ment, etc.) has been shown to increase public support of these taxes in other countries [2, 3,
33], but it in some LA countries, e.g. Mexico, this type of earmarking is not legally permitted.
Regulations to advertising or other forms of promotion of unhealthy food
and/or drinks (T)
Restrictions to the advertising and promotion of unhealthy food or drinks are by far the most
widespread regulations in Latin America. Not only have nine countries taken official action in
this direction, but industry-led initiatives have also been prolific.
Regulatory initiatives have adopted three basic forms: guidance, restrictions or messaging
(Table 5). Guidance is the most common, especially in industry pledges. It provides good-prac-
tice standards when food and drink advertising is directed to children, usually through generic
commitments not to motivate unhealthy habits (such as overeating or sedentary lifestyles) or
pledges not to exploit children’s innocence so as to increase sales. However, clear rules are usu-
ally lacking, and the specific content of these standards can be interpreted broadly. Moreover,
pre-established monitoring strategies and sanctions are rare (although not inexistent). Finally,
private committees whose objectivity is dubious are the usual monitors of industry pledges.
Restrictions also differ in their content and scope. Comparisons among countries are some-
what problematic because variations occur at different levels including, among others: (a) the
definition of publicity/promotion (does it include free distribution? Sponsorship? Special pro-
motions?); (b) media covered by the regulations (social media is an especially controversial
issue); (c) the scope of age-protection (which ranges from ages 12 to 18); (d) the conditions
under which advertisements are considered to be targeted at children (by measuring audience,
by the use of famous characters, by the use of colors, etc.); (e) standards used to define
“unhealthy food and drinks” (whether they are generically defined or apply specific rules
regarding maximum sugar content); and (f) sanctions for non-compliance.
Table 5. Distribution of public and private initiatives across the NUTRE framework in Latin America.
Country N U T R E
Children Taxes Advertisement Government Procurement Labelling
Public Private Public Private Public Private Public Private Public Private
Argentina x
Barbados x
Bolivia x x
Brazil x x x x x
Chile x x x x x
Colombia x x x x
Costa Rica x x
Dominica x
Ecuador x x x x x
El Salvador x
Mexico x x x x x
Peru x x
Uruguay x x x
Venezuela x x
“Public” refers to government initiatives and “Private” indicates private-initiative regulations.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0205694.t005
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Overall, Chile has the strictest restriction, having established a full prohibition on advertis-
ing food and drinks that are considered “high” in certain “critical nutrients” for children
under 14 [45]. Chilean regulation does not specify the media covered, although the wording of
the law includes a very broad definition of publicity, which suggests it covers media in all of its
forms. Furthermore, the country has explicitly prohibited free distribution and the use of
“commercial hooks” to attract children (including the use of famous characters, games, etc.). It
has also completely banned the advertisement of unhealthy food and drinks on TV and in cin-
emas from 6 am to 10 pm (regardless of the targeted audience), and only allows it in public
events, such as sports or cultural events, in exceptional cases.
In contrast, Mexico has also prohibited advertising unhealthy food and drinks to children,
but its restrictions cover only TV and cinemas [46]. The time frame is more permissive and
certain program exclusions (such as sports events or soap operas) further narrow children’s
protection. In a different approach, Brazil, considers all publicity targeting children (food-
related or otherwise) “abusive” [47], although the practical implications of such a statement
would require further case-by-case analysis.
Restrictions usually anticipate penalties for non-compliance, but monitoring strategies are
less frequent. Private initiatives in Brazil and Colombia are wide-ranging in their content,
pledging not to advertise to children under 12, but include no specifications regarding imple-
mentation efforts [12, 13].
Guidance or restrictions to advertising within the school environment are also common in
Latin America. Restrictions usually imply a full ban of advertisement in that setting and, with
the exception of Costa Rica’s ban that is not mandatory in private schools [15], they all apply
to both public and private schools at all levels. However, only Chile has designed some sort of
implementation strategy and Chile and Ecuador are the only countries to impose sanctions for
non-compliance as part of these regulations.
Finally, some countries mandate food or drink advertisements to include messages to either
promote healthy lifestyles (Bolivia and Chile), warn about the potential health effects of certain
products (Brazil and Peru) or do both (Ecuador and Mexico). Argentina attempted to include
such messaging, but the law was vetoed by the President in 2008. Brazil’s messaging regulation
was also suspended after a suit questioned the rules before the courts [6].
There is very little information regarding the implementation and/or impact of these adver-
tising regulations. Our review of the literature retrieved only one study [14] addressing the
issue directly by empirically observing the operation of pledges regarding food and drink
advertisements by signatory companies in Mexico. That study found that, despite the adoption
of industry pledges, Mexican children are heavily exposed to unhealthy food and drink ads on
TV, as 75% of these are directly or indirectly aimed at them.
Government procurement and/or public contracting restrictions (R)
Restrictions to the kind of beverages that can be purchased using government funds are the
least common forms of regulation in the region, although their potential to affect consumption
patterns could prove enormous [6]. LA governments often provide food-related assistance
either directly (in public school cafeterias, for example) or indirectly (through subsidies to the
poor), therefore, restrictions of the kind of food or drinks that can be purchased are likely to
affect many in the most vulnerable sectors of the population. Egalitarian arguments aside,
there are strong arguments in favor of restrictions to the purchase of SSBs, given their low
nutritional value and their harmful health effects, which contradict the very spirit of govern-
ment assistance.
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Only Brazil and Ecuador have taken action in this area and both have done so through
national legislation. Brazil has prohibited the purchase of drinks low in nutritional quality
using resources from the National Education Development fund, which finances the national
school food plan. It has also stated that a minimum of 30% of the expenditures must be used to
purchase food from local farmers. Ecuador has applied a broader regulation (not restricted to
the school environment), banning the distribution and use of products low in nutritional qual-
ity in food aid programs.
Although narrower in scope, Brazil’s legislation has a more detailed implementation strat-
egy, since provincial states are obliged to account for their expenses at the end of each school
year and can be denied further assistance if their expenditure has not complied with the pur-
chasing standards. In contrast, Ecuador has not determined legal sanctions for breaches of the
applicable restrictions, although it has created an ad hoc entity to promote the practical
enforcement of the law.
No research on the implementation or the impact of contracting regulations was found in
our literature review.
Front-of package labelling strategies (E)
Front-of-package (FOP) labelling strategies aim at improving point-of-purchase consumer
information to encourage healthier buying decisions and product reformulation. Although
most countries in the region apply some sort of mandatory nutritional labeling in the back of
food packages, compulsory FOP labelling is still relatively uncommon. The first country to
impose a FOP labelling regulation was Chile in 2012 and four other countries have followed
since. Most of these regulations have been approved through administrative resolutions and
only Chile and Bolivia have enacted laws specially focused on FOP labels. Industry-led initia-
tives are also scarce at the national level, but Coca Cola has implemented a private-initiative
international pledge to include calorie, sugar, fat and salt content in all its product labels.
Moreover, within Colombia, the Drink Industry Chamber (Cámara de la Industria de Bebidas
de la Asociación de empresarios de Colombia) has also committed to implement a FOP label in
drinks [12] (although the pledge does not specify what information will be included).
The label design required by FOP regulations differs among countries. Bolivia and Ecuador
have chosen a traffic-light signal to graphically warn consumers about high levels of sugar, cal-
ories, fat and salt. Although some studies have suggested that this label design is the one which
most consistently helps consumers identify healthier products [48,49], recent evidence has
suggested that clarity and simplicity might be the most important features of food labeling sys-
tems [50, 56]. This may make warning labels more promising than traffic-light labels [51] and
GDA [52]. However, more research comparing different strategies is needed before reaching
robust conclusions. The traffic-light label design was initially suggested in Chile [17], but the
proposal was overturned and changed into an octagonal black and white warning sign that
alerts consumers when products are “high in” certain nutrients. Finally, Venezuela regulated
SSB labels in particular, applying mandatory warning messages stating the risks of consump-
tion. Corporations have traditionally favored labels that refer to Guideline Daily Amounts
(GDA) as opposed to warning signs. GDA labelling is the one adopted by the Coca Cola pledge
and the one applied in Mexico.
Most LA countries have adopted negative FOP labelling, where consumers are warned
against the consumption of certain products as opposed to encouraged to purchase healthier
options. Only Mexico has designed a positive distinctive sign (called “sello nutrimental”) to
identify healthier consumer alternatives, which can be used by food companies only after
official authorization is granted. The use of this sign is voluntary and was designed to
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promote foods that meet certain nutritional criteria, which is why it can only be used after
authorities certify that the product meets those criteria and is therefore eligible to be pro-
moted accordingly.
Regulations also vary in the nutrient profiling schemes they use to determine which food
and drinks will carry a special label, although most apply a specific reference amount of sugar/
100 ml for SSBs. Although simple and widely used, this kind of scheme has the disadvantage of
not considering real serving sizes and conditions [53].
There is little information regarding the implementation of labelling strategies in Latin
America. Regulations mostly lack implementation and monitoring structures, although formal
sanctions are referred to in Chile, Mexico, Ecuador and Venezuela. Research from around the
globe provides inconclusive evidence as to consumer comprehension of labels and whether
labelling strategies effectively help change consumption habits and under which circumstances
[6, 7, 48, 54, 55, 56,57]. Studies on the impact of the LA labelling efforts were not found in our
review of the available literature and are urgently needed.
General limitations
Our study has some limitations that should be acknowledged. The methodology used to
retrieve regulatory initiatives was to some extent opportunistic, since systematized evidence
regarding legal regulations on SSBs in the region is scarce and/or not thorough. Hence,
although we attempted to capture all the relevant initiatives, some might have been left uncov-
ered. We also used the systematic literature review to cross-check our information but given
the scarcity of academic research on these recent regulations, this search provided little addi-
tional information. In order to aid future research, we have built a database with all the legal
regulations retrieved and posted them online in the web of the B.A.S.T.A. project available at
http://proyectobasta.esy.es.
Conclusion
Latin American countries are attempting to decrease SSB consumption through the use of var-
ious types of regulatory initiatives. We have analyzed each type of regulation separately for
practical purposes. However, it should be highlighted that any attempt to seriously tackle the
obesity epidemic should address the issue in multiple dimensions, since any single measure
would most likely prove insufficient [58]. Chile, Ecuador and Mexico’s experiences are out-
standing in this regard, as they have implemented a package of interventions across the
NUTRE categories. Ecuador and Chile’s cases are especially salient because their labelling
schemes help identify products that are banned from being sold or publicized in schools and
from being advertised to children. Mexico, by contrast, lacks a comprehensive strategy linking
its FOP labelling design with the application of other regulations. This means that additional
regulations are necessary to identify the products that can (or cannot) be sold in schools or
advertised, making it potentially challenging to identify infringements.
Chile’s case is especially salient because of its innovative, wide ranging policies which have
earned the country global recognition. Its labelling design is currently regarded as the most
promising in the world and is being used as a model and discussed by other countries in the
region, including Peru, Uruguay, Brazil and Argentina. Chile’s path is noteworthy because its
evidence-based framework law simultaneously covers most of the policies that have been rec-
ommended to tackle the obesity epidemic on all fronts, which is why it is being observed
auspiciously.
SSB industry resistance has been fierce [4, 30, 53] and is unlikely to cease given the decrease
in SSB consumption rates in developed-countries and the increased market share devoted to
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Latin America. Therefore, governments and public-health advocates should anticipate the
industry’s well-resourced, well-organized strategies.
Greater efforts should be made to build consensus across multiple constituencies, both in
the process of discussing reforms and in implementation stages. There is broad agreement
regarding the need for further integration between the public sector (at a national and local
level) and the private sector, academia and civil society organizations to secure successful obe-
sity prevention reforms [4, 30, 59, 60, 61]. Furthermore, there has often been a lack of public
participation in obesity-related reform processes in the region [4, 53, 60], which is likely to be
an obstacle for the successful enforcement of new food and drink regulations.
Information regarding the actual implementation of reforms, the human and financial
resources required and, eventually, their impact, is scarce for most of the new regulatory initia-
tives undertaken across LA [61]. As the analysis of the NUTRE framework shows, regulations
(mandatory and otherwise) often lack clear implementation, monitoring and evaluation strate-
gies, key factors in the success of legal reforms [61, 62, 63]. Evidence also accounts for a lack of
training and information of people meant to apply the new rules and, consequently, resistance
to change [29]. Much more research is needed to guide government and public health advo-
cates seeking to create effective SSB policies.
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